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correct way to measure welfare loss due to rent seeking. I conduct this analysis using a gen-
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Optimal Tariffs and Financial Assets
Hal R. Varian
It has been widely observed that investors' financial portfolios seem to be overly concentrated
in domestic securities, despite the beneficial reduction in risks that are possible from international
portfolio diversification. See for example, Feldstein and Hartman (1979), Obstfeld (1985), and
Summers (1985). Indeed, government tax policy in most countries seems to actively discourage
international diversification.
The Japanese government, for example, has placed restrictions on banks' net foreign exchange
positions, regulated banks' issue of Certificates of Deposit abroad, limited the amount of foreign
assets held by international investors, regulated long-term Euro-yen loans, and so on. Investment
trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions in Japan were not even allowed to hold foreign
securities until the early seventies, and foreigners were not allowed to hold many types of Japanese
financial instruments until the late seventies.1
The Japanese case is extreme, but it is common to see special witholding taxes on dividends paid
to foreigners, deductions rather than credits for foreign taxes paid, and other fiscal policies which
tend to discourage international capital flows. Most countries have, at least at some time in their
history, engaged in large-scale intervention in financial markets in ways that appear to be designed
to discourage trade in foreign assets. In some cases, such policies appear to be motivated by short-
run fluctuations in exchange rate movements. But in other cases, it appears that governments may
try to discourage trade in foreign assets as part of a long-run policy.
When we consider the riskiness inherent in international financial markets, long-run attempts
to discourage international portfolio diversification seem especially perverse. Grubel (1968), Levy
and Sarnat (1970), Solnik (1974), Grauer and Hakansson (1987) and many other authors have
pointed out that major stock indices in different countries often have rather low correlations with
each other, and that this can be exploited in the construction of optimal portfolios. For a recent
discussion see Section II of the comprehensive survey by Adler and Dumas (1983).
This paper was prepared for the symposium on Financial Investment in the U.S. and Japan held at the NYU
Graduate School of Business Administration, April 27 and 28, 1987. I wish to thank Roger Gordon, Theodore
Bergstrom, and Gary Saxonhouse for useful discussions about the topics considered in this paper.
1 In 1983-84 Japan agreed to a number of measures designed to liberalize these sorts of restrictions. See Frankel
(1982) for a summary of the economic impact of these policies.
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In the case of the U.S. and Japan, for example, the simple correlation of monthly price changes
for the major stock market indices during the period 1971-79 was .33. In some cases, such as
the U.S. and the U.K., the correlations were even negative. Such small correlations allow for
substantial risk reduction via diversification. To the extent that other countries' risks are not
perfectly with domestic risks, international investment offers highly beneficial diversification. Why
would countries want to discourage such portfolio diversification?
Gordon and Varian (1986) argue that such policy intervention may be an attempt to exploit
market power in international financial markets. Even though any single security may be a small
fraction of total world wealth, the total securities offered by a large country such as the United
States or Japan may represent a sizable fraction of world wealth. To the extent that risks faced by
different countries are independently distributed, each country's securities offer a unique source of
diversification. Thus, each country faces a downward sloping demand for its risky securities, and
therefore may find it beneficial to attempt to exploit its market power.
The tax policy in such a large country may be adjusted so as to exploit the downward sloping
demand for its securities. By artificially restricting trade in its domestic securities, a country can
raise the world price of those securities and thus increase the expected utility of its residents. Of
course, if all countries attempt to exploit their market power, the resulting restriction in trade may
make everyone worse off. Each country's attempt to shift the terms of trade in financial assets in
its favor results in an inefficient distribution of risk bearing.
The optimal tariff results of international trade describe how countries can set tariffs and export
controls so as to improve the terms of trade they face with respect to goods; we wish to apply those
same notions to financial assets. The specific structure of demand functions for financial assets
gives a special structure to the standard "large country" results of international trade theory and
allow for a more detailed analysis of the resulting equilibrium.
Gordon and Varian (1986) provide a detailed policy analysis of the optimal tariff in world fi-
nancial markets. In this paper, I derive a formula for the optimal tariff in general circumstances
and then apply this formula to the special case of financial markets. The particular case exam-
ined is significantly simpler version of the Gordon-Varian model which allows for a relatively easy
examination of the effects of tax policy on international risk-sharing.
1. A General Formula for the Optimal Tariff
We begin by examining the optimal tariff for a single large country. This is, of course, a classic
problem in international trade, and has been considered by a number of authors, among them
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Scitovsky (1942) and Graaf (1949). For a modern discussion, see Dixit and Norman (1980) and
Woodland (1982). The closest treatment to our own is that of Bergstrom (1982), except that we
use duality and focus on the representative consumer case.
Most of the existing literature on optimal tariffs seems to implicitly treat the case of an export
tariff. In this case it is natural to take the objective function of the exporting country to be the
maximization of tariff revenue. If, however, one examines the more economically natural case of a
tariff on imports, maximization of tariff revenue is no longer an appropriate objective. In this case,
the importing country must take into account not only the tariff revenue, but also the reduction
in domestic welfare resulting from facing higher world prices.2 In order to compute the optimal
tariff, the marginal gains from the tariff revenue must be balanced against the marginal losses to
domestic consumers and producers from the distorted prices.
Consider a country which is a large consumer of a particular imported good. This country wants
to choose a tariff on this imported good that makes its consumers as well off as possible, given the
demand and supply of the good by the rest of the world. Denote the world price of the good by p
and the tax on the good by t. If the country in question is large enough to have significant market
power, the equilibrium price of the good will depend on the tax imposed on it, so we indicate this
dependence by p(t).
The indirect utility of a representative consumer in the country under consideration is denoted
by v(p, y) where y is the consumer's income. We assume that this country will return the tariff
revenue to the representative consumer in a lump-sum manner. We denote this tariff revenue by
r(t) = tx(p(t) + t), (1)
where x(.) is the domestic consumer's demand function for the good. (In general the demand for
the good will depend on the consumer's money income, which will in turn depend on the magnitude
of the rebated tariff revenue. We ignore this general equilibrium income effect in what follows.)
The optimal tariff problem then becomes
max of p(t)+4-t, y +- r(t)).
The first-order condition for this problem is
2 Even in the case of an export tariff, there will typically be a reduction in producer profits due to distorted prices.
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Dividing this equation by Ov/Oy and applying Roy's identity gives
-x -p+ 1 r+ -- 0. (2)
Differentiating the definition of revenue given in (1) yields
Or Ox FOp 1-=t- I+1 +x,.
Ot Op Lot J
Substitute this into (2) and rearrange to find
[ Ox ap Oxt--xz -+t-=O.
Op jOt Op
It is useful to divide this expression by x and convert to elasticity form
t 8
-e '1' + E= 0.
Solving for t/p gives us
t _. 1 oop/t(3)
p E 11+Op/Ot]
Hence the optimal tariff on good i is inversely proportional to its elasticity of demand, weighted by
the responsiveness of the world price to the tariff. If a country is only a small part of world trade
in the good in question, dp/dt will be essentially zero, so that the optimal tariff in such a case is
zero. But if.a country is large enough so that its tax policy influences the world price of the good,
then it will pay it to set a tariff to exploit this market power.
In order to derive an expression for the bracketed term, we let X(p) be the demand for the good
by the rest of the world and S(p) be the world supply. Demand equals supply then can be written
as
x(p(t) + t) + X(p(t))= S(p(t)).
Differentiating with respect to t and solving for Op/8t gives us
Op -x/Op
Ot OD/p - OS/Op'
where D = x + X is total world demand. Multiplying the numerator and denominator of this
expression by p/D, and recognizing that D = S in equilibrium allows us to write
Op SE
- E -E, (4)
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where E is the elasticity of country i's demand for the good, s is the share of the country's con-
sumption of the good as a fraction of world consumption, ED is the elasticity of world demand and
Es is the elasticity of world supply.





The optimal tariff as a fraction of the world price will depend on the country's share of world
demand. For a country that is a small fraction of world demand, the optimal tariff is near zero.
But for a country with a significant share of world demand, the optimal tariff may be quite large.
2. Financial Assets
We now apply the calculations of the last section to a simple model of world trade in financial
assets. We will calculate the optimal tariff directly and also by applying formula (3). It will be
seen that applying the optimal tariff formula will allow for a cleaner and more easily generalized
analysis.
We suppose that there are two countries, 1 and 2. Each country i is endowed with a technology
that generates a random output in period 2 denoted by Vi. For convenience we assume that the
certain rate of interest is zero, and for computational simplicity we assume that Vi are independent
and Normally distributed with a mean Vi and variance a?.
We assume that there is an international market in these risky assets, and denote the before-tax
price of asset i by pi. Country i may choose to tax its residents' purchases of country j's security
with a specific tax of magnitude t,,. The revenues from this tax are returned to the residents as a
lump sum.
Let x; 3 denote country i's holdings of country j's security. Then the (random) wealth in coun-
try 1, say, will be given by
TV = TV0 +T ,..-_(P2._+_ t.,)_1 + ,.. +Tr- _V2,
where T = ta2 x1 is the lump sum tax rebate. For future reference we note that the mean and
variance of wealth are given by
W= Wo + T+(V1 - P1)iu +(V2 - P2 - t 2fr1
a2, zi~? + ia22
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The citizens of each country are assumed to have identical von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion of a. It is well-known that the assumption
of constant risk aversion, in conjunction with Normality implies that individuals will maximize a
linear function of mean and variance of wealth; that is, a mean-variance utility function of the form
W - (a/2)u2,.
Hence the maximization problem facing individuals in country 1 before any taxes are imposed
is:
max Wo + T + (V1 - p1)x11 + ( 2 - p2)x12 - (a/2)(x1 ci + z42 u2).
The first-order conditions for the optimal portfolio choice are:
V1 - pi - a1 = 0
V2 - p2 - ax1 2o2 = 0.
Solving these two equations gives us the asset demand functions for country 1:
Xi1 = 2-
ao'1
X1 _V 2 -p 2
ac2
Note that the demand functions are independent of the prices of other goods and income, which
were assumptions underlying the derivation of the optimal tariff formula derived above.
Let us now solve for the world equilibrium in the absence of any distorting taxes. The demand
equals supply condition for asset 1 is
211 + 21 = 1
V1 - p1  Vi-pi .
Solving, we have the equilibrium price of asset 1,
aa2
pi =Vi --. 2
Substituting back into the demand functions for asset 1 gives us the equilibrium demands for asset 1,
* = x = 1
The equilibrium in the absence of distorting taxes involves equal risk sharing: each country holds
a fully diversified portfolio consisting of equal shares of each other country's risky asset.
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3. Equilibrium with Distorting Taxes
Suppose now that country 1 puts a tax on its citizens' purchases of foreign assets. This raises the
price of country 2's security to p2 + t1 2. Let us solve for the effect of this tax on the equilibrium
price and quantity demanded of security 2.
Demand equals supply takes the form
x12 + X22 = 1
V2 -p 2 -t 1 2  V2 - p2
2 + 2 =1 -
Solving for p2 and the equilibrium quantities demanded yields




* 1 t122= 2 + .a (8)
Suppose now that country 1 recognizes its influence on the market price of asset 2. It would
generally make sense for it to set the tax on asset 2 so as to maximize the utility of its citizens,
taking into account its influence on the market price of asset 2.
This optimal tariff problem can be written as
max Wo + T + (V1 - p1)Xu + (2 - P2 - t1 2)x12 - (a/2)(x1i' + x 2 c2)
1 - _- t12
such that x12  2a
2 2aa2
ao + t1 2
P2 =V%2 2
T = t12x12 .
The first two constraints summarize the influence of country l's tax policy on the price and quan-
tity traded of country 2's asset while the last constraint is simply the definition of tax revenues.
Substituting the constraints into the objective function, dropping the inessential constants, and
rearranging yields
(aoi + tn)(aoj - t12) (a a__-__n
max - c~~
4aul 2 2aua
After some more manipulation and elimination of inessential conistants, we reduce the problem to
max tlnao' 2 2-is
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which has the solution
* acT
3
Note that the optimal tariff depends only on the variance of the foreign asset - terms involving
the expected return have dropped out. This is because it is only the variance of the foreign asset
that provides something unique - namely, the diversifiable risk. That is, it is the independent
riskiness of the foreign asset that makes it less than a perfect substitute for domestic assets, and
therefore leads to a less than perfectly elastic demand for it.





Recall that in the no-tariff case, the efficient allocation of risk bearing was for each country to hold
half of each country's risk. Here, the attempt to exploit market power in each risky asset has lead
to country 1 holding only a third of country 2's risky asset.
Of course, country 2 can do the same calculations. Since country 2 has a monoposony position
in providing a buyer for country 1's risk, country 2 may be expected to discourage its residents
from holding the risky asset of the other country. The net result is that each country only ends up
holding a third of the other country's risk. The "optimal" tariff on country 2's security has led to
an inefficient allocation of risk bearing.
4. A Simpler Calculation
In the previous section we have calculated the optimal tariff directly. However, it is much easier to
use the formula for the optimal tariff derived via duality in Section 1, which we restate here using
the notation of the last section:
tn _ 1r op2/ot
P2 E 1+Op2 /ot 12 ]
Using equation (6) we see that 0p2 /0t12 = -1/2. The elasticity of demand can be derived from
the expression for the demand function. We have
12o2 a V2aP2- n 2 P2-i'






The expression V2 - p2 can be interpreted as the risk premium - the' difference between the
expected value of the asset and its market price. Thus we see that the optimal tax in this case is
simply half of the risk premium.
Using the equilibrium value of p2 from equation (6), we have
ao2 + t1
t12= 44
which can be solved to give
t12 = ~3
just as we derived in Section 3.
5. Extensions of the Symmetric Case
The symmetric country case that we have examined up until now is a very special one. But armed
with the general formula for the optimal tax, we are in a position to easily examine generalizations
of the symmetric case to somewhat more realistic situations.
Different Degrees of Risk Aversion
First, we consider the case where the two countries have different degrees of risk aversion. Now the
demand equals supply condition for world equilibrium takes the form
V21-2 - n 2 -2
It follows that the equilibrium price is




atn2  a1 +a 2
Substituting this into the formula for the optimal tax, we find that
a1 +a2
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Note that country 1's tax on country 2's risky asset is proportional to country 2's degree of risk
aversion - the more risk averse country 2 is, the more heavily country 1 wants to tax its risky
asset. This fact did not emerge from the symmetric case.
Intuitively, the more risk averse country is more anxious to shift its risk, and is therefore more
susceptible to exploitation by the other country. That is, the more risk averse'country will have
a more inelastic net supply of its asset to the world markets and will be willing to accept worse
terms of trade simply to shift some of its risk to world markets.
Several Countries
Another case of interest is the case of n countries. In this case, we suppose that country i taxes
country 2's asset at a rate of t42 and solve for country l's optimal tax rate.
In this case, demand equals supply takes the form
V2 -p2 -ti2 V2 -p2
i#2 ac s a 2
which is easily solved for p2:
E 2 tit + ao!2P2 = V2 2-+ n
It follows that dp2 /dt1 2 = -1/n, and substituting this expression into the formula for the optimal
tax, we find that
-=V 2 - p2
n
Thus, country 1 taxes only 1/nth of the risk premium on country 2's risky asset. Substituting the
equilibrium value of P2, this expression reduces to
t1i 2 2+ aoa
n2
In the symmetric solution, all countries choose the same tax rate so that t 12 = ti2 , and we have
Thus as the number of countries increases, the tax rate declines at a rate proportional to the squar'c
of the number of countries. This calculation suggests that the gains from attempting to use taxes
to exploit market power diminish rapidly as more countries adopt this policy.
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6. Summary
We have derived a general formula for an optimal tariff using duality theory and applied it to the
optimal taxation of internationally traded financial assets. The computations involved are much
simpler than those involved in using the direct method.
We have seen that the optimal tax in our framework will be a tax on the risk premium. The
size of the tax will be directly proportional to the riskiness of the foreign assets and the degree of
risk aversion of the exporting country. As the number of countries engaged in this tactic increase,
the size of the optimal tax will decrease in proportion to the square of the number of countries.
Thus the gains from exploitation rapidly diminish as the number of participants increase.
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